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et al.: Equal Protection

EQUAL PROTECTION
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11:
No person shall be denied the equalprotection of the lmvs of this
state or any subdivision thereof.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1:
No state shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdictionthe
equal protection of the laws.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Weinbaum v. Cuomo1
(decided September 28, 1995)
Defendants appealed an order of the New York County
Supreme Court denying their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
complaint for failing to set forth a cause of action. 2 The
constitutional issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs'
complaint stated a cause of action under the Equal Protection
Clause of the New York State Constitution 3 based on their
allegation that the defendants furnished the State University of
New York [hereinafter SUNY] school system with more state
funds than the City University of New York [hereinafter CUNY]
school system because of the different racial compositions of each

1. 631 N.Y.S.2d 825 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1995).

2. Id. at 826. Additionally, defendants asserted non-justiciability and lack
of standing as grounds for their dismissal motion. Id.
3. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This section provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color,
creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by
the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
Id.
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system. 4 In light of Campaignfor Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of
New York, 5 where the court of appeals held that a plaintiff
alleging equal protection violations based on a "disproportionate
impact upon a suspect class" must establish intentional
discrimination, 6 the Appellate Division, First Department, in
Weinbaum, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. 7 The court
found that the complaint failed to "set forth any facts tending to
show that in making their decisions regarding funding of the two
systems, the defendants acted with a discriminatory
purpose ... "8
Funding for the SUNY and CUNY systems is made by a
"'lump sum appropriation' for each college of both systems." 9
Although the student populations of each system are
approximately the same size, it is uncontested that the SUNY
system receives a greater share of the state funding. 10 The
systems vary in racial and ethnic composition based on the fact
that "SUNY's student body is predominantly composed of anglocaucasian students, [whereas] CUNY's student body is
predominantly composed of non-anglo-caucasian students." 11 The
plaintiffs, using an "'appropriation per full-time enrolled student'
formula" to calculate funding, charged that the disparity in
funding of the two systems was "impermissibly based
on ...

race."

12

The Weinbaum court declined to recognize what it considered a
mere allegation of "disparate impact in funding, and not an
4. Weinbaum, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
5. 86 N.Y.2d 307, 321, 655 N.E.2d 661, 669, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 573
(1995).
6. Id.
7. Weinbaum, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 827.

8. Id. Plaintiffs' causes of action under N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 40 and
40-c and N.Y. Education Law §§ 6201 and 6221 were also rejected. Id. at

828.
9. Id.at 827.

10. Id.at 826.
11. Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs have not, however, alleged that
this difference "is due to any kind of purposeful or intentional state action."
Id.
12. Id. at 827.
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illegal discriminatory purpose" 13 as sufficient to state a cause of
action under the Equal Protection Clause. 14 Citing the court of

appeals ruling in Campaignfor Fiscal Equity, Inc., 15 the court
held that plaintiffs could move forward only if they alleged
intentional discrimination on the part of the state in its funding of
the SUNY and CUNY §ystems. 16 In Campaignfor FiscalEquity

Inc., the plaintiffs raised an equal protection challenge against the
state scheme, which provided funding for the New York City
public schools. 17 The court of appeals dismissed that cause of
action, "rel[ying] on the case law from [the Court of Appeals]
and the [United States] Supreme Court holding that an equal

protection cause of action based upon a disproportionate impact
upon a suspect class requires establishment of intentional

discrimination."18
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing

Development Corp.,19 the United States Supreme Court rejected
the respondent's claim that the Village of Arlington Height's
refusal of its application for the re-zoning of a parcel of land,
which would have permitted construction of "low- and moderate13.
14.
15.
(1995).
16.

Id.
Id.
86 N.Y.2d 307, 321, 655 N.E.2d 661, 669, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 573
Weinbaum, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 827. The court stated that:

While we agree ...

that if the Executive or Legislative branches of

government were to maintain a policy or practice of disparate funding of
State financed higher education institutions motivated by racial bias such
policy or practice would be prohibited by the State Constitution's equal
protection clause, we do not agree... that such a claim has been
adequately set forth in this complaint.
Id.
17. Campaignfor FiscalEquity, 86 N.Y.2d at 312-13, 655 N.E.2d at 66364, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
18. Id. at 321, 655 N.E.2d at 669, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 573 (citing, Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); People v. New York
City Tr. Auth., 59 N.Y.2d 343, 350, 452 N.E.2d 316, 319, 465 N.Y.S.2d
502, 505 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 43-44, 439
N.E.2d 359, 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 650-51 (1982)).
19. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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income" housing, violated the Equal Protection Clause. 20 One of
the respondents, an African-American who worked in Arlington
Heights but lived roughly twenty miles away, alleged that if the
development project had been approved, he would have moved
there with his son and mother. 2 1 He claimed that the refusal of
the re-zoning application deprived him of the opportunity to live
closer to his place of employment and that the denial was racially
discriminatory. 22 While holding that "racially disproportionate
impact" in itself was insufficient to establish a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause, 23 the Court also noted that "[t]he
impact of the official action... may provide an important
starting point" in an inquiry as to whether the state had an
invidious discriminatory intent. 24 Nevertheless, Justice Powell
unambiguously stated that "official action will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact." 25
New York has followed federal law by requiring a showing of
discriminatory intent to establish a cognizable cause of action
against the state for a violation of equal protection based on
disproportionate impact of official action upon a suspect class. 26
Although, as Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence in
Washington v. Davis,27 "the line between discriminatory purpose
and discriminatory impact" is not always bright, 2 8 the
discrimination alleged in Weinbaum was not nearly as stark as

20. Id. at 254-55.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 266.

25. Id. at 264-65.
26. Weinbaum, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 827 (stating that "under New York law,
,an equal protection cause of action based upon a disproportionate impact upon
a suspect class requires establishment of intentional discrimination'") (quoting
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 321, 655
N.E.2d 661, 669, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 573 (1995)).
27. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

28. Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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that alleged in Gomillion v. Lightfogt29 or ick Wo v. Hopkins.30
In Gomillion and. Yick. Wo, violations of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Federal Constitution 31 were found as a result of

racially disproportionate impact on a suspect class, even without
an allegation of intentional discrimination, based on the
inexplicable and severe nature of the discrimination. The nature
of the discrimination in Weinbauin was not so severe or
inexplicable. Allocation of state resources for education is solidly
within the province of the legislature. Given that the plaintiffs in
Weinbaum did not allege, "even in a conclusory fashion, that the
State maintains two different higher education systems with
access, opportunity and admission being restricted based on race
or ethnicity," 32 the court concluded, that the Equal Protection
Clause does not "require the State to equalize the two systems
which, for demographic reasons not attributed to defendants,

29. 364 U.S. 339, 340-41, 347-48 (1960) (finding a potential violation of
the Equal Protection Clause where an act by the legislature that changed the
shape of the City of Tuskegee from a square to a figure with twenty eight sides
had the effect of removing from the city limits all but four or five of the four
hundred black voters, without removing one white resident or voter).
30. 118 U.S. 356, 357-59, 374 (1886) (finding violation of the Equal
Protection Clause where a local ordinance prohibiting operation of a laundry
not located in a brick or stone building without the consent of a board of
supervisors precluded two hundred Chinese nationals from operating laundries,
but only precluded one non-Chinese applicant). Justice Matthews explained
that:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibitiofi of
the Constitution.
Id. at 373-74 (emphasis added). Thus, laws applied with an "unequal hand"
(treating similarly situated people differently) and an "evil eye" (having an
impermissible purpose), will violate equal protection.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part:
"No State shall ...deny to. any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
32. Weinbaum, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
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have developed student bodies unequal in their racial and ethnic
3
composition.,, 3
SECOND DEPARTMENT
34
Abberbock v. County of Nassau

(decided March 29, 1995)

The plaintiffs sought an order pronouncing three ordinances
passed by Nassau County, freezing and cutting salaries of
management/confidential nonunion workers and increasing
salaries of non-management/confidential union workers,
unconstitutional 35 on the grounds that the ordinances violated the
Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal 36 and New York State
Constitutions. 37 The court held that the ordinances did not violate
the Equal Protection Clauses of either the Federal or New York
State Constitutions because, under the rational basis test, the
economic classification made between nonunion and union
employees was presumed to be rationally related to the

furtherance of a legitimate goal of the County of Nassau and as
such, the ordinances represented a valid exercise of Nassau
38
County's legislative authority.
33. Id.
34. 213 A.D.2d 691, 624 N.Y.S.2d 446 (2d Dep't 1995).
35. Id. at 691, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
in pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
37. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
38. Abberbock, 213 A.D.2d at 691-92, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 447. In addition,
the plaintiffs claimed that the ordinances violated section 1307 of the Nassau
County Charter, which requires "salaries to be standardized 'so that, as near
as may be, equal pay may be given for equal work .... "' Id. at 692, 624
N.Y.S.2d at 448 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The appellate
division determined that the charter had not been violated because "[t]he
general principal of 'equal pay for equal work' need not be applied in all
circumstances." Id.
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